I settle the computational complexity of studentproject-resource matching-allocation problems, in which students and resources are assigned to projects (Yamaguchi and Yokoo, 2017) . A project's capacity for students is endogenously determined by the resources allocated to it. I show that finding a nonwasteful matching is FP NP [log]-hard, and deciding a stable matching is NP NP -complete. To obtain these results, I introduce two new problems: (i) PARETOPARTITION, shown FP NP [poly]-hard and also strongly FP NP [log]-hard, and (ii) ∀∃-4-PARTITION, shown strongly NP NP -complete.
• ≻ P = (≻ p ) p∈P are the projects' preferences over students.
• Resource r is compatible with T r ⊆ P , and T R = (T r ) r∈R .
• Resource r has capacity q r ∈ N >0 , and q R = (q r ) r∈R . For every student s ∈ S, order ≻ s represents her preference over set P ∪ {∅}. For every project p ∈ P , order ≻ p represents its preference over set S ∪ {∅}. 1 A contract (s, p) ∈ S × P is a couple of a student and a project, which means that student s is matched to project p. Preferences naturally extend over contracts. Contract (s, p) is acceptable for student s (resp. project p) if p ≻ s ∅ holds (resp. s ≻ p ∅), and acceptable when both hold. I denote the set of acceptable contracts by X ⊆ S × P . 2 Given Y ⊆ X, student s and project p, let Y s denote {(s, p) ∈ Y | p ∈ P } and let Y p denote {(s, p) ∈ Y | s ∈ S}.
1 One may extend preferences ≻p onto 2 S in a non-specified manner which satisfy responsiveness and separability. That is: ∀s, s ′ ∈ S, ∀S ′ ⊆ S \ {s, s ′ }, s ≻p s ′ ⇔ S ′ ∪ {s} ≻p S ′ ∪ {s ′ } and (resp. ) ∀s ∈ S, ∀S ′ ⊆ S \{s}, s ≻p ∅ ⇔ S ′ ∪ {s} ≻p S ′ . 2 Since this technical note does not deal with mechanism design issues, I assume that there is no private information in an instance.
Definition 2 (Matching). A matching is a subset of acceptable contracts Y ⊆ X such that: ∀s ∈ S, |Y s | ≤ 1. I abuse notation Y in a functional manner:
• Y (s) ∈ P ∪ {∅} is the project s is matched, and • Y (p) ⊆ S is the set of students matched to p.
An allocation µ : R → P maps each resource r to a compatible project µ(r) ∈ T r . Let q µ (p) = r∈µ −1 (p) q r . 3 Definition 3 (Feasibility). A feasible matching (Y, µ) is a matching-allocation couple s.t.: ∀p ∈ P, |Y p | ≤ q µ (p).
Definition 4 (Nonwastefulness). Given a feasible matching (Y, µ), acceptable contract (s, p) ∈ X is a claiming pair iff:
Couple (Y, µ) is nonwasteful if it admits no claiming pair.
Definition 5 (Fairness). For feasible matching (Y, µ), contract (s, p) ∈ X \ Y is an envious pair 6 if and only if:
• student s has preference p ≻ s Y (s), and • there exists student s ′ ∈ Y (p) such that s ≻ p s ′ . 7
Feasible matching (Y, µ) is fair if it has no envious pair.
Definition 6 (Stability). Feasible matching (Y, µ) is stable if it is nonwasteful and fair (no claiming/envious pair).
This technical note focuses on the computation of a nonwasteful and fair (i.e. stable) matching in SPRs. An SPR belongs to a general class of problems, where distributional constraints satisfy a condition called heredity 8 (Goto et al., 2017) . They present two general strategyproof mechanisms. 3 For µ −1 (p) = ∅, I assume that an empty sum equals zero. 4 This condition is always true since (s, p) is acceptable. Assuming separability -which is not formally required -, it also means that project p will improve by adding s to its current students Y (p).
Assuming responsiveness -which is not formally required -, it means that in its current matched students Y (p), project p prefers to replace student s ′ by s. 8 Heredity means that if matching Y is feasible, then any of its subsets are also feasible. An SPR satisfies this property.
First, Serial Dictatorship (SD) obtains a nonwasteful matching. SD matches students one by one based on a fixed ordering. Let Y denote the current (partial) matching. For each student s, SD chooses (s, p) ∈ X and add it to Y , where p is her most preferred project s.t. Y ∪ {(s, p)} is feasible with some allocation µ. Unfortunately, as described later, SD is too computationally expensive 9 and too unfair. Second, Artificial Caps Deferred Acceptance (ACDA) obtains a fair matching in polynomial-time. The idea is to fix one resource allocation µ and run the well-known Deferred Acceptance (DA) (Gale and Shapley, 1962) .
Unfortunately, nonwastefulness and fairness are incompatible. Let us show an example with two students s a , s b , two projects p a , p b , and a unitary resource compatible with both. Students' preferences are s a : p a ≻ p b and s b : p b ≻ p a . Projects' are p a : s b ≻ s a and p b : s a ≻ s b . By symmetry, assume the resource is allocated to p a . From fairness, s b must be allocated to p a . Then (s b , p b ) becomes a claiming pair. I use this example as a building block in Figure 2 .
Preliminaries on Complexity
I assume the following common knowledge: decision and function problem, length function, classes P, NP, coNP, FP NP , NP NP , coNP NP , complementation, (metric) polynomial-time many-one reduction, (strong) hardness and completeness. An SPR instance has length Θ(nm + md).
Definition 7. I study the following problems.
• SPR/FA:
Given an SPR (instance) and a matching, is it feasible?
• SPR/NW/VERIF: Given an SPR and a feasible matching, is it nonwasteful?
• SPR/NW/FIND: Given an SPR, find a nonwasteful matching.
• SPR/STABLE/VERIF: Given an SPR and a feasible matching, is it stable?
• SPR/STABLE/EXIST: Given an SPR, does a stable matching exist?
For this purpose, I create two new fundamental problems.
• PARETOPARTITION: Given positive integer multiset W = {w 1 , . . . , w n } and target θ ∈ N,
Find a partition of W that is Pareto efficient 10 with respect to deficit vector δ. • ∀∃-4-PARTITION:
Given a list of positive integers W = (w 1 , . . . , w 4m ), target θ ∈ N, and a list of couples
if σ(j) = 1 then u j and v j are in the same subset, if σ(j) = 0 then u j and v j are in different subsets. Does, for every map σ : [ℓ] → {0, 1}, a σ-satisfying partition of W into m subsets exist?
Proof. Since an allocation µ is an efficiently verifiable yes certificate, SPR/FA∈NP. For hardness, any instance of 4-PARTITION, defined by positive integers multiset W = {w 1 , . . . , w 4m } and target θ ∈ N (with w∈W w = mθ) is reduced to an instance of SPR/FA with m projects. In the matching, θ students are matched to each project. Resources R are identified with W : q R = (w 1 , . . . , w 4m ) and T r = P . Crucially, since 4-PARTITION is NP-hard even if its integers are polynomially bounded, the number of students is polynomial. The correspondence is straightforward between a partition of W into m sets that hit θ and an allocation with capacity for θ students on m projects.
Intricate complexity results follow from the hardness of feasibility. Since a similar construction from PARTITION with two projects requires exponentially more students, I create PARETOPARTITION and ∀∃-4-PARTITION and show that they are strongly 11 hard.
The Complexity of Nonwastefulness
Here I first show that there is no natural verification procedure that makes computing a nonwasteful matching (whose existence is guaranteed by SD) belong to NP. Indeed, I then show that SPR/NW/FIND is FP NP [log]-hard (e.g. hard for a logarithmic number of calls to SAT).
Theorem 2. SPR/NW/VERIF is coNP-complete, even if each student only has one acceptable project.
Proof. Claiming pair (s, p) and allocation µ ′ that makes it feasible are efficiently verifiable no-certificates. Hence, SPR/NW/VERIF is in coNP. To show coNP-hardness, any instance W = {w 1 , . . . , w 4m } of 4-PARTITION with target θ (assuming w∈W w = mθ) is reduced to the following co-instance, whose yes-answers are for existent deviations. There are m + 2 projects. For i ∈ [m], θ students want to attend p i , mθ students want to attend p m+1 , and mθ + m who want to attend p m+2 . In matching Y , all students are matched but one student s * from p m+2 . For i ∈ [m], project p i , receives resource r xi with capacity q rx i = θ + 1 and i ∈ [m + 1]}. Project p m+2 receives resource r z with capacity q rz = mθ + m − 1 and T rz = {p m+1 , p m+2 }. Since integers w i and θ are polynomial, so is the number of students. There is solution V 1 , . . . , V m iff allocation µ ′ (dashed in Figure 1 ) is feasible and (s * , p m+2 ) is a claiming pair.
(yes⇒yes) If there is a solution V 1 , . . . , V m , then (s * , p m+2 ) is a claiming pair, as allocation µ ′ (dashed in Figure 1 
Theorem 3. SPR/NW/FIND is FP NP [log]-hard, even if each student only has one acceptable project.
Proof. SD shows that SPR/NW/FIND belongs to FP NP . Hardness follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 below.
Proof. Let any instance of MAX3DM be defined by finite sets A, B, C with |A| = |B| = |C| = n and triplets set
In a (partial) 3-dimensional matching (3DM), any element of A ∪ B ∪ C occurs at most once in M ′ . The goal is to maximize t∈M ′ v t for M ′ ⊆ M a (partial) 3-dimensional matching. For every a i ∈ A (resp. b j ∈ B, c k ∈ C), let #a i (resp. #b j , #c k ) denote the number of occurrences of a i (resp. b j , c k ) in M : the number of triplets that contain a i (resp. b j , c k ). Let v M denote total payoff t∈M v t . The elements are identified with integers i, j, k ∈ [n] and t ∈ [m].
I reduce this problem to the following instance of PARE-TOPARTITION for which finding a solution produces an optimum (solution) for the given MAX3DM instance. Set W contains 6m different integers that must be partitioned into m + 1 different subsets of various cardinalities. Every subset bears one objective for Pareto efficiency. The idea is that a Pareto efficient deficit vector will always have deficit zero on the m first subsets and gives the optimal value of MAX3DM by the deficit of the last subset. Given basis β ∈ N ≥2 and integer sequence (z i ) i∈N , I define integer . . . z 2 z 1 z 0 β by i≥0 z i β i , where z i = 0 when it is not written. Let β be an integer large enough for such representation in basis β (as below) to never have carryovers. Choosing β = max{32mn, v M } + 1 will largely satisfy the purpose. The integers in set W are represented below: 
For each element a i ∈ A, I introduce one actual integer w(a i ) representing the actual element intended to go with the triplets in a 3-dimensional matching, and #a i − 1 dummies that will go with the triplets that are not in the 3-dimensional matching. Similarly, I introduce #b j integers for every b j ∈ B and #c k integers for every c k ∈ C. For every triplet t ∈ M , I introduce two integers w(v t ) whose roles I precisely describe later. The idea is that every subset V i , which bears one objective for Pareto efficiency, has a column-wise lexicographic preference on the integers, from heaviest weight β 7 to the lowest β 0 , because in basis β, sums of integers in W never have carryovers from a column to a heavier one. Before starting, remark that two gap integers w gap in a same subset would be inefficient. So, let us assume w.l.o.g. that there is one gap integer w gap per subset in V 1 , . . . , V m (and none in V m+1 ). Hence, the targets for V 1 , . . . , V m become: θ ′ = 5 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 β First, due to the heaviest digits, each subset V 1 , . . . , V m must contain five elements, and subset V m+1 must contain m elements to induce a deficit of approximately zero if we round the digits of lower weight β 6 . . . β 0 . Otherwise, since the sum of the heaviest digits is 6m, any other repartition will induce (approximate) deficits in multiples of −β 7 for some subsets and be Pareto dominated.
Second, for similar reasons, by the second heaviest digits (the powers of 2), subset V m+1 must contain number m of w(v) integers. Also, for subsets V 1 , . . . , V m , digits on β 5 , . . . , β 2 (that contain integers ±i, ±j, ±k, ±t) put every triple integer w(a i , b j , c k ) precisely with its own elements (actual or dummies): w(a i ), w(b j ), w(c k ) and its own payoff integer w(v t ). To sum up, by rounding the two lower digits, any partition V 1 , . . . , V m , V m+1 which respects the above constraints has (approximate) deficits zero for every subset V i . Any other partition would be Pareto dominated by this (approximate) ideal point, hence not Pareto efficient.
While the deficit on digit β 1 for V m+1 is always zero, and the deficit on digit β 0 for V 1 , . . . , V m is also always zero, payoff goal integer w(v t ) only goes in V m+1 when the (only) three actual elements integers are together, like in a (partial) 3-dimensional matching, to yield deficits zero on digit β 1 for V 1 , . . . , V m . Indeed, if a payoff goal integer w(v t ) cheats and goes in V m+1 without V t containing its three actual elements, then deficit δ t of V t becomes δ ′ t ≤ −β, while V m+1 only improves its deficit by v t (from δ m+1 to δ ′ m+1 = δ m+1 + v t ). Since deficits are defined up to a permutation 12 , such cheating is Pareto-dominated:
All in all, Pareto efficiency, while constraining partitions to structure like a 3-dimensional matching M ′ , also requires optimal deficit δ m+1 = t∈M ′ v t − v M on V m+1 (up to a subsets permutation) : This construction is a metric reduction. Since no integer exceeds β 8 and unweighted MAX3DM (i.e. v t ∈ {0, 1}) is FP NP [log]-hard (Gasarch, Krentel, and Rappoport, 1995, Th. 3.5) , PARE-TOPARTITION is strongly FP NP [log]-hard.
Lemma 2. PARETOPARTITION ≤ p SPR/NW/FIND
Proof. I reduce any instance W = {w 1 , . . . , w n } and θ ∈ N of PARETOPARTITION to an instance of SPR/NW/FIND. There are m projects p 1 , . . . , p m ; for every project p i there is a separate set of θ students who only consider p i acceptable (and reciprocally). Crucially, since numbers in the PARE-TOPARTITION instance are polynomially bounded, there is only a polynomial number of students. Set of resources R is identified with integer set W : any resource is compatible with any project and q R = (w 1 , . . . , w n ).
Computing a nonwasteful matching (Y, µ) precisely outputs partition V 1 , . . . , V m ≡ µ −1 (p 1 ), . . . , µ −1 (p m ) with Pareto efficient deficits. If there were a partition (allocation) whose deficits (unmatched students) Pareto dominated the deficits of V 1 , . . . , V m , a claiming pair would exist. (It is impossible to obtain one more capacity for an unmatched student without decreasing an other capacity q µ (p i ) ≤ θ i .)
The Complexity of Stability
A matching that is both nonwasteful and fair (i.e., stable) may not exist. In this section, I settle the complexity of deciding whether such a matching exists in a given SPR as Σ P 2 -complete. Theorem 4. SPR/STABLE/VERIF is also coNP-complete, even if each student only has one acceptable project.
Proof. The proof is the same as for SPR/NW/VERIF, since no envious pair is possible in our constructions. Proof. Let any instance of ∀∃-3DM be defined by finite sets A, B, C with |A| = |B| = |C| = n and two disjoint triplet sets M, N ⊆ A × B × C, with |M | = m and |N | = m ′ . This decision problem asks the following question:
where "M ′ ∪ N ′ is a 3DM" means that any element of A ∪ B∪C occurs exactly once in M ′ ∪N ′ . This is a Π p 2 -complete problem (McLoughlin, 1984) . For every a i ∈ A (resp. b j ∈ B, c k ∈ C), let #a i (resp. #b j , #c k ) denote the number of occurrences of a i (resp. b j , c k ) in M and N : how many triplets does a i contain (resp. b j , c k )? I identify elements and triplets with integers i, j, k ∈ [n] and t ∈ [m + m ′ ].
I reduce this instance to the following ∀∃-4-PARTITION instance. List W contains the 4(m + m ′ ) integers depicted below in basis β = 4(m + m ′ )|A| + 1 (def. in proof of Lemma 1). For every triplet t = (a i , b j , c k ) ∈ M ∪ N , there is one "triplet" integer w(a i , b j , c k ) ∈ N. For every element a i ∈ A, I introduce one actual integer w(a i ) that represents the actual element intended to go with the triplets in the 3DM and #a i − 1 dummies that will go with the triplets that are not in the 3-dimensional matching. Similarly, I introduce #b j integers for each b j ∈ B and #c k integers for each c k ∈ C.
List L has length ℓ = |M |: every triplet t = (a i , b j , c k ) ∈ M is reduced to couple u t v t between "triplet" integer u t = w(a i , b j , c k ) and "actual" integer v t = w(a i ). This instance asks whether:
∀σ : [ℓ] → {0, 1}, ∃σ-satisfying partition of W.
First, since β is large enough, additions in W never have carryovers. Hence, subsets must hit the target on each column of this representation. Consequently, in any 4-partition of W , there are four elements (in case it was not required), one of each in the following: "triplet" integers, element-a integers, element-b integers and element-c integers. Moreover, "triplet" integer w(a i , b j , c k ) is with "its" elements w(a i ), w(b j ) and w(c k ). Also, actual elements must be in the same subset and dummies in the others. All in all, any 3-dimensional matching M ′ ∪ N ′ is in correspondence with a 4-partition. Validity follows from the correspondence between M ′ (taking or not taking elements in M ) and σ (enforcing triplet integers w(t) for t ∈ M in the same or different subsets as its actual elements).
(yes⇒yes) Assume the 3DM instance is a yes, and let σ : [ℓ] → {0, 1} be any couple enforcement/forbidding function. We construct a σ-satisfying 4-partition in correspondence with the following 3-dimensional matching M ′ ∪ N ′ : for t ∈ [ℓ] ≡ M , triplet t is in M ′ if and only if σ(t) = 1; then the assumption gives N ′ such that M ′ ∪ N ′ is a 3DM. I construct the corresponding 4-partition (see paragraph above), and it is σ-satisfying.
(yes⇐yes) Assume the partition instance is a yes, and let us show that for any M ′ ⊆ M , there is N ′ ⊆ N such that M ′ ∪ N ′ is a 3DM. Let σ be defined as σ(t) = 1 if and only if t ∈ M ′ . A σ-satisfying 4-partition exists, and is in correspondence with some 3DM M ′ ∪ N ′ (see above).
This result holds even if couples are disjoint and no subset contains two heads (u elements). Hardness holds even though numbers are polynomially bounded by β 6 , hence strong hardness holds.
